Despite the creation of the CNRS, the land issue was not prioritized, hampering the peace process. Indeed, there had been no model for rural issues with rebel representation.1 Nevertheless, in 2004, 90,321 refugees from Tanzania and other neighbouring countries returned to Burundi.2 UNHCR and ONUB supported the return process. The timetable included the implementation of ceasefire provisions, the formation of a transitional government and a new transitional government with the CNDD-FDD. The establishment of a transitional national assembly, the sending of AMIB and UN peacekeeping forces took place on time. Other provisions, such as the rehabilitation of displaced persons and refugees, the introduction of the CT and judicial reforms, could not be sought as quickly as in the Arusha agreement. No serious offences were reported between the government and the armed movement or the 16 political parties that signed the agreement in August 2000.1 Three Tutsi parties – Independent Workers` Party, National Alliance for Rights and Development and Rally for Democracy and Economy and Social Development – were not signatories to the agreement on 20 September 2000.2 CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu-FLN did not sign the agreement. On 2 December 2002, the CNDD-FDD, the main Hutu party, signed a ceasefire agreement with the transitional government. The document reports an update of negotiations in Arusha, including the integration and demobilization of the armed forces, which examines violent reports, possible integration processes and the estimated number of troops to be demobilized. Ambassador Flaten writes: „The Rwandans are ready with a firm proposal for integration and have given good thought to the demobilization that followed. The difficult problem will be to find an agreement on the part of the RPF that will be integrated into the Rwandan army. In May 1992, Robert Flaten, then U.S. Ambassador to Rwanda, returned to Washington on the talks and strategies for peace negotiations between the Rwandan government and the RPF.

The RPF calls for the United States to be present in the negotiations „due to doubts about the neutrality of the French.“ The United States has stated that it is prepared to participate in interposed enterprises only if all parties, including the French, are „ready for the United States to participate.“ 5) The parties set up a joint commission for peace and security (`ceasefire commission`, responsible for peacekeeping and security functions and working closely with a peacekeeping force after the agreement came into force; The U.S. Embassy in Rwanda reminds the Secretary of State of concerns about the transition to peace, particularly tensions over the demobilization process. Ambassador Rawson writes that „at the registered level, many equate multiparty and transitional government with their imminent demobilization, as most of the demobilized soldiers come from the ranks of enlisted soldiers.